

Exercise Evaluation Report

Exercise Whakarauora Tangata

Location: Tauranga – Bay of Plenty

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1. Executive Summary

The Bay of Plenty Incident Management Team exercise (IMTEX) was the first of four exercises being held as part of Exercise Whakarauora Tangata series. This was a functional, table-top exercise, delivered using dynamic simulation with multiple injects to control the scenario.

The exercise was run on Wednesday 26 July 2023 at Bay of Plenty CDEM ECC, Tauranga and was designed to test an inter-agency response to the lifesaving aspects of a Mass Rescue Operation (MRO), within a Police District. NZSAR developed and planned the exercise and ran Exercise Control (EXCON). Over 65 people were involved from 18 different agencies.

The scenario for Exercise Whakarauora Tangata centred around a boutique cruise ship foundering on Astrolab Reef and catching fire as it approached Tauranga port. The simulated ship was approximately 350-400ft, with 256 crew and passengers. A mayday was declared and an evacuation of the ship was ordered.

RCCNZ received the initial PAN PAN notification from the ship, as well as the subsequent MAYDAY. RCCNZ advised Police comms early, confirming their role as CAT II Coordinating authority and that the operation was nationally significant. Functional CIMS team units were established as an Incident Management Team (IMT) at the CDEM ECC and delivered briefings, an Action Plan and Situation Report over an 8-hour period.

The objectives were designed to test various aspects of the operations including IMT capability, and inter-organisational cooperation, effectiveness and reporting. The general structure and nature of the exercise worked well to test individuals, agencies and broader cross-agency integration.

Participants were highly engaged throughout the day, and the tempo remained high. There were key learnings that predominantly self-identified through the hot debrief and cold debrief process. The IMT had clearly identified good opportunities to learn out of this exercise.

Key recommendations from the exercise include: Ensure IMT is briefed on the requirement for a documented and visually displayed Mission statement and Initial Action Plan (IAP) early stage; Create more frequent IMTEX opportunities so the Police and RCCNZ can cross train and maintain relationships with support agencies; Develop a common operating system that allows for an enhanced ability for RCCNZ, the Police and supporting agencies to work together to achieve the mission intent.

The outcome of the emergency exercise scenario was successful in line with the stated objectives and identified KPI's.

1. Recommendations

Plans

Ensure IMT is briefed on the requirement for a documented and visually displayed Mission statement and Initial Action Plan (IAP) early stage.

- During this exercise an IAP was not developed initially and not displayed. The mission was not clearly identified in line with RCCNZ's initial request. This was remedied mid exercise. The mission and IAP should be disseminated amongst and across the IMT including all support agencies in order to help guide and control the entire operation. Written status reports would also have assisted here.
- Ensure visual aids (boards, digital screens, whiteboards, maps) are utilised effectively to assist in creating situation awareness for all teams and agencies involved. Develop a coordinated communications plan to assist in the support agencies' response requirements.
- Some agencies could have been of great benefit early in the current exercise for passenger/crew reconciliation and support – MBIE, MSD, NZ Customs, MFAT.

Cross Training

Create more frequent IMTEX opportunities so the Police and RCCNZ can cross train and maintain relationships with support agencies.

- In this exercise, the IMT appeared to struggle achieving effective liaison with RCCNZ. Early clarity of RCCNZ's actions (initial SITREP and regular updates) as the lead agency ensuring the water-based SAROP was managed, would have enabled a targeted IAP to be developed and maintained and aided the Police in managing the land based response and recovery effort. There was some crossover in IMT wanting to take on RCCNZ's remit initially.
- Ensure the IMT are aware of the areas of responsibility in a Cat II nationally-significant SAR, to ensure tasks are allocated in accordance with the Incident Controller's aim and intent, and to test the role and responsibility structure.

Common Operating Picture

Develop processes or systems to support all agencies involved in the response to achieve a common understanding of the operation

- During this exercise, cross agency information flow could have been enhanced for RCCNZ and the Police, and across the health and aviation teams by ensuring all operational information was made available and accessible to all participants. This would have disseminated a common operating picture and situational awareness, and ensured all agencies were aware of the current aim and priorities. In this exercise, the Police system also blocked exercise emails which made information flow more challenging.

2. Introduction

The Bay of Plenty District has been identified as an area of concern for a large and/or complex water-based emergency event. Whilst there is a wealth of assets available across the Bay of Plenty for a water-based rescue, coordinating all the key agencies to ensure a focused and effective response to an emergency requires practice through exercising.

Exercise Whakarauora Tangata was conducted in the Bay of Plenty Police District and was Phase 1 of a four phase exercise series focused on a water-based scenario and response.

The exercise was played out in real-time and allowed for a range of issues to be practiced by participants.

Role-players were used during the exercise to simulate non-playing agencies, and there were over 90 'injects' providing challenges to the IMT that replicated realistic situations. Specifics of the scenario and its timeline were held in confidence by the exercise planning team in order to allow participants to enjoy the most realistic experience possible, within the constraints of the exercise. Scenario injects were provided to players to simulate real-life information and their actions to this information.

The primary geographic focus of the scenario was the marine approaches to Tauranga, and coastal areas of the Western Bay of Plenty.

2.1. Background to the Exercise

The intention was to conduct a scenario emergency exercise in order to ensure a CAT II SAROP was identified, responded to effectively, and multiple agencies worked together for a common mission.

All agencies, participants, observers and Exercise Control (Excon) staff of Exercise Whakarauora Tangata assembled at the CDEM ECC in Tauranga where the IMT were established in a large operating space, with High Control (Hi-con) and Low Control (Low-con) staged in a separate space nearby. This was a combined functional and desktop exercise. Players were expected to follow their plans and procedures as they would in a real situation, except where informed otherwise.

The exercise was played in real-time. However, some scenario time-jumps were used to progress the scenario, and allow for a range of issues to be practiced by participants.

2.2. Dates, Location, Organising Agency(s)

The emergency exercise was run on Wednesday 26 July 2023 at Bay of Plenty CDEM ECC, 1 Elizabeth Street, Tauranga. NZSAR developed and planned the exercise and ran EXCON. Over 65 people were involved from 18 different agencies.

2.3. Participating Organisations

Bay of Plenty Regional Council, Harbour Master

Fire and Emergency New Zealand

Hato Hone St John

Hauora a Toi Bay of Plenty

New Zealand Customs Service

NZ Police, BOP District IMT

Rescue Coordination Centre NZ

Tauranga City Council Emergency Management

Support Agencies: Surf Life Saving NZ, Coastguard, LandSAR, Civil Defence, AREC, Bay of Plenty DHB, Red Cross, Shipping Agent, MBIE, MFAT, MSD, Maritime NZ

2.4. Exercise Aim

The purpose of this exercise was to rehearse skills, processes and procedures for the district level Incident Management Team, and to test the efficacy of existing or new plans.

2.5. Exercise Objectives

The overarching objectives for this exercise were:

1. Validate notification/activation procedures of IMT in the context of a SAR incident
2. Clarify roles and responsibilities within and across agencies
3. Practice command and control frameworks
4. Evaluate current and developing plans to identify deficiencies
5. Evaluate capacity to meet SAR/NSS obligations
6. Practice and evaluate reconciliation processes

2.6. Exercise Scenario

At 0609, RCCNZ received a PANPAN (non-emergency alert) notification for the SILVER PACIFIC 2, a boutique cruise ship (approximately 350-400ft) aground on Astrolabe Reef, approximately 25km NE of Tauranga, 7km N of Motiti Island. This PANPAN message was then relayed to the Police.

This progressed to MAYDAY (personnel in grave/imminent danger) due to a fire in the engine room. The 256 passengers and crew abandoned ship in the following vessels: 1x lifeboat, 3x liferafts, 5x zodiacs. Vessels and personnel in the water were washing up in the vicinity of Motiti, Maketu and Papamoa.

This was a Category II SAROP, led by RCC with Police tasked as On-Scene Command and managing the land-based response and recovery effort.

The situation presented required coordination across SAR coordinating authorities, SAR agencies and supporting organisations; and created a significant strain on the local and national resources. Additionally, the scenario included complexities that created a truly nationally-significant Category-2 incident, requiring national-level coordination and management.

2.7. Exercise Scope

This exercise focused on the following components:

- Police District IMT support to a nationally significant Category II SAR, including:
 - Activation of local area Police SAR;
 - Escalation and set up of district IMT;
 - IMT support and coordination of local SAR and supplementary activities; and
- Management of reconciliation and welfare support, including:
 - Activation of CDEM in support of Police SAR response;
 - Set up and management of local Welfare centre;
 - Triage and supporting reconciliation of rescued people.

3. Evaluation Methodology

3.1. The agreed outcomes of the evaluation activity

- Carry out observation of the IMT and its function in an emergency exercise scenario.
- Observe actions to develop and enhance functional team methodology within the TCC ECC environment and to practice and refine plan development.
- To ensure value is delivered for all personnel involved.
- A report to be written outlining observations of the SAREX in relation to the stated objectives and the KPIs.
- Recommendations to be made based on those observations.

3.2. Evaluation scope

The evaluation scope was primarily focused on the Police District IMT support to a nationally significant Category II SAROP.

This included evaluating:

- Activation of local area Police SAR;
- Escalation and set up of district IMT;
- IMT support and coordination of local SAR and supplementary activities;

and management of reconciliation and welfare support, including:

- Activation of CDEM in support of Police SAR response;
- Set up and management of local Welfare centre;
- Triage and supporting reconciliation of rescued people.

3.3. Aspects of the exercise observed, what was not observed

All aspects of the IMT exercise were observed. The evaluator did not evaluate Hi-con or Lo-con operating in a separate space.

The evaluator was present from the time the exercise commenced till the time it ended and had access to every area appropriate – particularly all briefings and SITREP handover - with a high level of cooperation and consultation around the evaluation.

The Hot Debrief was also attended immediately after the exercise, with a Cold Debrief occurring the following morning.

Evidence was collected via observations, discussions, photos and notes taken at the time.

3.4. The process followed in preparing and submitting the report

Once the notes, photographs and documents were all collated the evaluator report was completed in draft format and submitted for comments. This was then finalised and submitted.

3.5. Other information

N/A

4. Findings

Comments made in this section are observations made based on the six major objectives, and in relation to the KPI's.

4.1 Validate notification/activation procedures of IMT in the context of a SAR incident

- Cat II operation confirmed with RCCNZ coordinating the water-based search and rescue part of the operation, with Police as OSC (and managing the land response and recovery effort), Incident identified as a nationally significant SAR early stage and escalated accordingly. Responded appropriately to early stage notification.
- IMT was activated relatively quickly and in place at the CDEM ECC by 0800, which helped deliver a control plan.
- IAP not developed initially and not displayed. Mission not clearly identified in line with RCC's initial request. This was remedied mid ex. SITREP was thorough.
- Support agency engagement occurred early in the exercise and support agencies were generally well coordinated. Some agencies could have been of great benefit early in the exercise for passenger/crew reconciliation and support – MBIE, MSD, Customs, MFAT.

4.2 Clarify roles and responsibilities within and across agencies

- IMT appeared to struggle achieving effective liaison with RCCNZ. Some crossover in IMT wanting to take on RCC remit initially. Once realigned, delegations were better managed. Good delegation to Civil Defence.
- Cross agency info flow could have been enhanced for RCCNZ and the Police, and across the health and aviation teams. Police system blocked exercise emails. A Common operating system would obviously assist this.
- RCCNZ's plan needs to be projected to the Police in order to create situation awareness, and to provide clarification of roles/responsibilities.
- Roles and responsibilities were established early in the Incident Management Team (IMT) with representatives from all key agencies present. Scenario, process, and regular update briefings were held.
- At the initial 0840 briefing, it was good to see roles laid out with task elements. There was initially no hub allocations (e.g. intel, planning, ops) for functional teams, however this was remedied quickly.
- All team members had functional vests which made for a well-coordinated and visually appreciable situation. Operational logs were established and maintained.
- Ensure personnel are not getting caught 'in the weeds' or stepping outside their role. IMT should not be concerned with the precise details of how the rescue is occurring; SAR should be making recommendations but not decisions at a high level.

4.3 Practice command and control frameworks

- Regular IMT briefings were held and led by the IC. 12 minutes to run each briefing – they could be shortened by cutting replicated data. Integration of support agencies within the IMT would have enhanced communication.
- Good operating space which allowed for a highly collaborative environment. Could have arranged the room more effectively however.
- Safety – First two briefings only discussed police staff being deployed. What about pilot vessel, surf lifesaving, FENZ and all operational staff.
- Starting the exercise after the CAT 2/MRO decision was already made works well.

- IMT reality versus theory – time and personnel available to complete IAP, set clear intentions, maintain complete and accurate records.
- Task personnel available to commence the log, IAP and other planning documents as required. Ask for quiet or personnel to wait outside if required.
- RCCNZ felt that the person role playing the Aviation Assets, at exercise control, was trying to be the Air Directing Officer without being tasked. Better briefing and monitoring of the role players might be helpful.

4.4 Evaluate current and developing plans to identify deficiencies

- Early clarity of RCC's actions (initial Sitrep and regular updates) would have enabled a targeted IAP to be developed and maintained. Understanding of RCC plan early would have kept IMT to task for land-based support.
- Ensure common operating picture and situation awareness – ensure all are aware of current aim and priorities; read back important information, especially figures and coordinates; close the loop on all interactions (internal and external).
- Feedback was that information sharing via visual/display aids could have been more effective – written status reports would have helped.
- Information Collection Planning continued with requests for information delivered by EXCON. Record important information on the whiteboard/SARTrack so it can be easily read by personnel coming into the room, saving time and repetition for everyone to have the important information (everyone wrote the same information in their notebook and got told the same thing).
- Pictures of the cruise ship sinking were useful.
- A Hot Debrief occurred at the end of the exercise which allowed all to participate in feedback – Appendix B. And a Cold Debrief occurred the following day from an agency perspective.
- Ensure Action Plan remains up-to-date and all are aware of changes and updates. Maintain records such that command/handover can walk in and understand the situation without being briefed – important information on whiteboards/SARTrack and in concise and logical format.
- Maintain records so that if anything happens to you, someone else could step in seamlessly.
- All contributors to SITREP state whether they can meet the command aim; what they have achieved since the previous SITREP, what they are doing until the next SITREP, what additional resources/support they require to achieve the aim.

4.5 Evaluate capacity to meet SAR/NSS obligations

- A coordinated comms plan would have aided the support agencies' response requirements. Most agencies identified and advised early. FENZ unclear of their responsibilities.
- Police liaison with RCCNZ could have been enhanced. No NZDF LO or FENZ LO initially at RCCNZ.
- Wealth of assets available and systems allowed for their effective deployment. Capacity seemed unconstrained for SAR obligations. RCCNZ tasked air assets and appeared to have enough to meet the requirements of the exercise.
- FENZ - ensuring there is someone in the RCC control centre from a fire perspective. Welfare had had a thorough and coordinated approach to reconciling passengers/ crew as they came ashore.

- The PIM function appeared busy throughout and was led by an experienced media team. Key PIM messaging focused on: Early/simple public messages, comms out via RCC for the water-based SAROP, and via the Police for passenger/crew reconciliation ashore and DVI.
- Should identify a plan for key timings – initial briefing, IAP, status reports, sitrep, mass rescue/evac plan, shift handover. This will help inform NSS resource requirements should the SAROP extend or become more complex.

4.6 Practice and evaluate reconciliation processes

- There was no common operating platform that all agencies could access.
- Investigative team and Intelligence function were actively verifying.
- Health and Welfare could have had more accurate info on passenger status/movements. Some agencies could have been of great benefit early in the exercise for passenger/crew reconciliation and support. – MBIE, Customs, MFAT, MSD, cruise ship company.
- Good management of welfare support was observed. Activation of CDEM in support of Police SAR response included a focused welfare control centre, a triage Casualty Clearing Point (CCP), and supporting reconciliation process for rescued people.
- Regarding reconciliation, think about the “what next and what if” – be proactive, not reactive (e.g. how to account for personnel coming ashore, ‘heads up’ to St John and hospital for patients, considering DVI and mortuary capacity and preparations – place National DVI team on standby).
- Record times next to each vessel to aid reconciliation, and have a running total so all can see/track (e.g. Zodiac one ashore with 5 pers at 1105, liferaft 2 ashore at 1315, etc.). Forecast need and resources for reconciliation, temporary mortuary, behaviour issues with passengers/patients, medical events/accidents, welfare, handovers, additional resources, safety, catering. Identify priorities at the shift handover briefing (SITREP) – e.g. ‘priority is 52 people outstanding’, “what don’t we know?”

5. Conclusions

Formulating a clear mission and an IAP early and disseminating amongst and across the IMT helps guide and control the entire operation. The IMT can improve their understanding and effectiveness by liaising more with other teams to appreciate the broader picture and intent. Visual aids (boards, digital screens, whiteboards, maps) also assist in creating situation awareness for all teams and agencies involved.

RCCNZ's plan needs to be projected to the Police in order to create situation awareness, and to provide clarification of roles/responsibilities.

Reminding the IMT of the areas of responsibility in a Cat II nationally-significant SAR will ensure tasks are allocated in accordance with the IC's aim and intent.

The general structure and nature of the exercise worked well to test individuals, agencies and broader cross-agency integration.

Participants were highly engaged throughout the day, and the tempo remained high. There were key learnings that predominantly self-identified through the hot debrief and cold debrief process.

The outcome of the emergency exercise scenario was successful in line with the stated objectives and KPI's.

6. Appendices

Appendix A - Key Performance Indicators (KPI's)

This appendix lists the objectives and sub-objectives and key performance indicators being used for evaluation of the exercise. Practise unified control, across all levels, during a coordinated inter-agency response to a nationally significant SAR incident Assess or identify areas of particular risk or opportunity for the SAR sector in the coordinated response to a NATSIG SAROP

Practise unified control, across all levels, during a coordinated inter-agency response to a nationally significant SAR incident.			
Assess or identify areas of particular risk or opportunity for the SAR sector in the coordinated response to a NATSIG SAROP.			
NEP Objective	Contributing Ex Objective	Key Performance Indicators	Evaluator Comment
NO 1.0 - Lead a coordinated interagency response to a significant incident or emerging threat that warrants a NSS activation.	CO 1.1 – Identify nationally significant incident or emerging threat.	KPI 1.1.1 Incident is identified as a nationally significant SAR incident requiring activation of the appropriate corresponding plan and/or agencies.	Identified early stage and escalated accordingly. Responded appropriately to early stage notification.
		KPI 1.1.2 Lead Coordinating Authority for the response to the nationally significant SAR incident is identified, and communicated to all support agencies.	Cat II operation confirmed with RCCNZ, with Police as OSC, coordinating the water-based search and rescue part of the operation.
	CO 1.2 - Implement appropriate escalation measures that activate relevant elements of the NSS.	KPI 1.2.1 Appropriate reports are made to alert higher level HQ.	Implemented via the ECC.
		KPI 1.2.3 Key stakeholders are identified and informed of the activation(s).	Multiple agencies involved. Cruise company and shipping agent contact delayed.
CO 1.3 - Develop an	KPI 1.3.1 Planning processes are as established in standard	IAP not developed initially and	

	effective action plan to manage the response to a Nationally significant SAR incident.	operating procedures and CIMS.	not displayed. Mission not clearly identified in line with RCC's initial request. This was remedied mid ex. SITREP was thorough.
		KPI 1.3.2 The action plan is phased in accordance with the Nationally Significant SAR plan/policy/framework.	Mass Rescue Operations (MRO) Response Plan should have been referenced. Objectives once developed, were phased to NatSigSAR framework.
		KPI 1.3.3 Likely threats and associated consequences and risks are embedded in the action plan.	Safety function needs to ensure risks to all pers responding are covered off, not just the Police (initially).
		KPI 1.3.4 Relevant support agencies are integrated into action planning processes.	Support agencies were not integrated into IMT function roles.
	CO 1.4 - Coordinate the interagency response to the nationally significant SAR incident in accordance with the agency emergency plans, the action plan, CIMS, and legal/policy frameworks.	KPI 1.4.1 Liaison arrangements are maintained as required throughout the duration of the response.	IMT appeared to struggle achieving effective liaison with RCCNZ.
		KPI 1.4.2 Response is managed in accordance with plans and within mandated frameworks.	Once mission was clarified, in accordance with IAP and CIMS. MRO may have assisted.
		KPI 1.4.3 The systems, processes and resources are appropriate for implementing the action plan, or adjusted to meet the needs of the situation.	Appropriate and dynamically adjusted as required throughout the exercise.

		KPI 1.4.4 IMT delegates tasks to support agencies within legal frameworks and in accordance with RCCNZ requirements.	Good delegation to CD. Some crossover in IMT wanting to take on RCC remit initially. Once realigned, delegations were better managed.
		KPI 1.4.5 Appropriate and timely reports are provided within command structures, and to coordinating authorities.	IMT briefings held regularly. Status reports were verbal rather than written. SITREP was thorough and detailed.
CO 1.5 – Identify and communicate additional support and/or resource requirements.		KPI 1.5.1 Support and/or resources required from other agencies are identified and needs communicated effectively.	Integration of support agencies within the IMT would have enhanced communication.
		KPI 1.5.2 Liaison arrangements are activated in accordance with standard operating procedures	Relied on the expertise and understanding of the Police staff within the IMT rather than other agency liaison personnel.
CO 1.6 – Specialist functional groups are activated in support of the response.		KPI 1.6.1 Relevant specialist groups are identified and activated in accordance with standard operating procedures.	Identified and activated. The hospital should have been engaged earlier for logistics. Ships agent was very useful.
CO 1.7 - Strengthen personal and interagency collaborative relationships.		KPI 1.9.1 IMT personnel work in a collaborative manner with colleagues	Good operating space which allowed for a highly collaborative environment. Could have arranged room more effectively however.
		KPI 1.9.2 Information is shared and utilised across agencies to assist in relationship and resilience building from other	Feedback was that information sharing via visual/display aids could have been more

		agencies.	effective – written status reports would have helped.
Assess the effectiveness and suitability of existing SAR frameworks, memoranda of understanding, plans, procedures, systems, and processes.			
Increase knowledge and understanding of roles and responsibilities within and across SAR agencies and support agencies.			
NEP Objective	Contributing Ex Objective	Key Performance Indicators	Evaluator Comment
NO 2.0 - Support a coordinated interagency response to a significant incident or emerging threat that warrants a NSS activation.	CO 2.1 – Coordinate the support of a significant incident or emerging threat	KPI 2.1.1 Support agencies are coordinated in the identification of a nationally significant SAR incident requiring activation of the appropriate corresponding plans.	Occurred early in the exercise, support agencies generally well coordinated. Some agencies could have been of great benefit early – MBIE, Customs, MSD, MFAT.
		KPI 2.1.2 Support agency requirements for the response to a nationally significant SAR incident are identified, and communicated to all agencies.	A coordinated comms plan would have aided this. Most agencies identified and advised early. FENZ unclear of their responsibilities.
	CO 2.2 - Coordinate the development of an action plan in accordance with standard operating procedures	KPI 2.2.1 Support agencies contribute to the planning processes as established in standard operating procedures and CIMS.	Effectively managed in the IMT via CIMS structure. Integration of support agencies within the IMT would more effectively support planning.
		KPI 2.2.2 Threats and associated risks identified by the support agencies are embedded in the action plan.	Getting an IAP established and communicated early would have negated some confusion.
		KPI 2.2.3 Support agencies develop action plans to detail the	CD role with welfare was well

		tasks assigned to them by the Lead Coordinating Authority or IMT.	developed with support from St John and Red Cross.
		KPI 2.2.4 Where appropriate, legal and policy frameworks are used to support the action plan.	Became more prevalent as the exercise developed.
CO 2.3 – Coordinate the interagency response to the nationally significant SAR incident in accordance with the agency emergency plans, the action plan, CIMS, and legal/policy frameworks.		PI 2.3.1 Support agency staff assigned to work in the response have a level of competency appropriate to their role.	Highly competent and experienced staff involved.
		KPI 2.3.2 Liaison arrangements are maintained as required throughout the duration of the response.	Police liaison with RCC could have been enhanced. No NZDF LO or FENZ LO initially at RCC.
		KPI 2.3.3 Response is supported in accordance with plans and within mandated frameworks.	Occurred. Welfare responsibilities well supported by CD.
		KPI 2.3.4 The systems, processes, and resources are appropriate for implementing the action plan.	Wealth of assets available and systems allowed for their effective deployment.
		KPI 2.3.5 Support agencies carry out the delegated tasks in a timely manner in accordance with standard operating procedures.	Generally very effective. At times there was a time lag from task to action due to information flow.
		KPI 2.3.6 As appropriate, site, local, regional and national levels of support requirements are identified and implemented.	Appropriate and enacted. Wide range of support agencies and resources were integrated – esp towards the latter part of the ex.
	CO 2.4 - Support		KPI 2.4.1 Support agencies can support the inter-agency IMT

	coordination centres in accordance with standard operating procedures	as required by the lead Coordinating Authority.	operating platform that all agencies could access.
		KPI 2.4.2 Support agencies can sustain an operational response for the length of time required.	Multi agency support occurred, with shift change requirements taken into account.
		KPI 2.4.3 Support agencies can reconstitute following a response to a major security incident.	Noted in the debrief.
	CO 2.5 - Strengthen personal and interagency collaborative relationships.	KPI 2.6.1 Support agency personnel work in a collaborative manner with colleagues from other agencies.	Feedback from both debriefs noted the excellent manner with which teams collaborated to achieve the shared aim. Interoperability was noted as good, however time spent across agencies beyond exercises will further enhance collaborative relationships.
Test new or developing concepts, plans, procedures, tools, and equipment.			
Assess or identify areas of particular risk or opportunity for the SAR sector in the coordinated response to a NATSIG SAROP.			
NEP Objective	Contributing Ex Objective	Key Performance Indicators	Evaluator Comment
NO 3.0 - Enable high level all-of-government decision making through the National Security	CO 3.1 Agencies fulfil their roles as expected in the National Security System response governance structures	KPI 3.1.1 Appropriate agencies are identified and contribute to the response in accordance with their mandated roles and responsibilities.	RCC lead agency in Cat II rescue, with Police as support. Roles and responsibilities were established early in the IMT.
		KPI 3.1.2. There is a clear delineation in roles and responsibilities and appropriate tasking across agencies.	Generally well delineated. 'Sticking to lanes' was reinforced at various times.

System.			NEMA CIMS cards in each IMT box assisted with this.
		KPI 3.1.3. Future requirements beyond the immediate response, together with associated resource/aligned agency are identified and communicated	Shift handover briefing highlighted future agency and resource needs. Forward planning was occurring.
	CO 3.2 High quality information is used in decision-making	KPI 3.2.1 Information provided to decision-makers is of high quality and credible.	Early clarity of RCC's actions (initial Sitrep and regular updates) would have enabled a targeted IAP to be developed and maintained.
		KPI 3.2.2 Information provided to decision-makers is subjected to a robust assessment process.	Any misinformation was interrogated for accuracy. Investigative team was thorough in this process.
	CO 3.3 Key stakeholders are consulted in the decision-making process	KPI 3.3.1 All stakeholders are identified and consulted with in a timely manner	Generally good. Understanding of RCC plan early would have kept IMT to task for land-based support.
		KPI 3.3.2 Decisions are communicated to key stakeholders in a timely manner in accordance with standard operating procedures	Some delays from task to action, however SOP's were followed and effective.
Increase knowledge and understanding of roles and responsibilities within and across SAR agencies and support agencies.			
NEP Objective	Contributing Ex Objective	Key Performance Indicators	Evaluator Comment
NO 5.0 - Situational	CO 5.1 Incident information is	KPI 5.1.1 Accurate information is communicated within agencies (vertically) in a timely manner in accordance with	Verbal communications and liaison were effective and

awareness is established and maintained during the exercise	effectively managed and communicated by all agencies involved in the response	standard operating procedures	appropriate to SOP's. Reconciliation numbers were aligned with Excon at end ex.
		KPI 5.1.2 Information is communicated between agencies (horizontally) in a timely manner in accordance with existing communications policies, procedures, and MOUs.	Cross agency info flow could have been enhanced for RCC and Police, and across the health and aviation teams. Police system blocked exercise emails. A Common operating system would obviously assist this.
		KPI 5.1.3 Information is appropriately stored.	Storage of info was in different agencies operating systems. Police – Riod, CD – Teams, St John – internal.
		KPI 5.1.4 IT systems and processes are capable of sharing information in a timely manner.	As per 5.1.3, sharing across agencies was inhibited. Ongoing issue - Across NZ there are over 80 operating systems for emergency mgmt. recording/operating.
		KPI 5.1.5 All agencies have the appropriate equipment and resources to manage information effectively.	Generally yes, however each agency has idiosyncrasies specific to that agency to ensure effectiveness.
CO 5.2 Response documentation is correctly produced	KPI 5.2.1 Incident response documents (Action Plans, Situation Reports) are produced and disseminated accurately and in a timely manner to relevant stakeholders.	Creating written IAP and status updates that could then be shared on-screen or via visual boards would have aided	

			collective situation awareness.
	CO 5.3 Information is communicated within and across agencies to support reconciliation	KPI 5.3.1 The information needs for reconciliation are identified.	Occurred, and was reconciled during briefing and informal sub group meetings.
		KPI 5.3.2 Information is obtained from appropriate source(s).	Well sourced with the exception of the ships captain and crew for the vessel.
		KPI 5.3.3 Information is verified for accuracy.	Investigative team and Intell were actively verifying. Health and Welfare could have had more accurate info on passenger status/movements.
		KPI 5.3.4 Appropriate information is shared with those agencies who need it.	Appropriate and observed.
		KPI 5.3.5 Appropriate actions are taken to protect data security, individuals' privacy and confidentiality.	Appropriate.
Increase knowledge and understanding of roles and responsibilities within and across SAR agencies and support agencies.			
NEP Objective	Contributing Ex Objective	Key Performance Indicators	Evaluator Comment
NO 6.0 - Manage and deliver public information management to establish and maintain public	CO 6.1 Appropriate information processes and tools are used	KPI 6.1.1 Timely, accurate, and clear information is provided to stakeholders and target audiences.	PIM agency roles well understood; RCCNZ – rescue info, Police – land-based info and DVI. Communicated effectively.
		KPI 6.1.2 Messages align with strategic and operational	Appropriate.

assurance and confidence in the response		objectives.	
		KPI 6.1.3 Proactive messaging across the full range of platforms fills the demand for information and shapes the conversation.	Media releases and social media feeds observed. Proactive for frequency.
	CO 6.2 Coordinated and consistent public messaging is produced.	KPI 6.2.1 The PIM function is established and adopts and interagency approach.	Established early and responsibility for 'lane' information identified and followed.
		KPI 6.2.2 The production and promulgation of public information is coordinated across agencies.	PIM messaging could have been shared across agencies for clarity and accuracy checking before dissemination.
	CO 6.3 Messaging aligns with and supports the operational response and key objectives.	KPI 6.3.1 Messages are validated against high level communications objectives and released in an appropriate and timely manner.	Observation of thorough public messaging and a complete press release. Information was effectively managed during the exercise.
	CO 6.4 Timely and accurate information is delivered to those who need it.	KPI 6.4.2 Information is shared across agencies prior to release publicly.	This is an area for development – sharing of information prior to release would have been ideal.
		KPI 6.4.3 Supporting agencies have a common understanding of the operational picture.	Early IAP and use of visual boards in the IMT would assist.

Appendix B – Functional Teams Debrief Feedback

Sample of Hot Debrief Feedback – Functional Teams

Functional Team	Things Done Well	Areas For Improvement
IC	Team worked well together	Roles between RCC/Maritime and Police
OPS MANAGER	Went well, better than the last one.	Exercise went better once roles were established within and across agencies
INTELL	Good team	Comms developed and got better. Single POC difficult for some things
PLANNING	Integration with ops	Comms between teams needs to faster
INVESTIGATION	-	Verifying info, IMT reconciliation, IMT functionality improvement, IT – email didn't work, lack of standardised forms
LOGISTICS	Worked really well as a team	Clarify aim early
SAFETY	-	Struggled to get info of where everybody was
PIM	-	Confusion with who was looking after media
SAR CORD	-	Early ID of own and other agency assets
WELFARE (CD, MSD, RED CROSS)	Inter-agency cooperation, Learning around ship incidents and response requirements	One platform for info, sharing, Having a response manager
FENZ	-	Fire – who's in charge if on a ship?, Info flow can be clunky and slow, Response coordinator would help
CUSTOMS	-	Could have given more info if requested
ST JOHN	Calm organised chaos	Air desk exposed comms gap, Trying to get clarity of victim numbers
SURF and COASTGUARD	Good to work with each other, good working in a team on a Cat II	Log process, Stop self-tasking
LANDSAR	Good to work with St John	Comms – 360 degree was challenging at times
AREC	Learnt a lot being involved	
RCC	-	Could have helped IMT better – explaining what the RCC 'lane' is
LOW-CON	Teams and organisational units worked well	Info versus intell
HIGH-CON	Busy pushing injects – very useful	ID issues (email)
IWI LIAISON	-	Must keep Iwi a the forefront of planning - e.g. tidal flows/driftng, transport
DEPUTY IC	Real time role playing, Functions worked well	Station view/briefing – clear, not clear once handed over to IMT, Intent/purpose, need clear mission
POLICE OBSERVER	Initial response was great/clam, Recon really clear, Info void handled well, Calm leadership,	RCC needed to step up and provide briefing – would have formed commanders intent, IAP/mission stment
SHIP AGENT	-	Bridge crew can provide full details
MBIE	-	Can be used to set up temp visas/accom

Sample of Cold Debrief Feedback - Agencies

Agency	Things Done Well	What to do differently next time	Process Gaps
RCCNZ	Getting everyone in the room, relationships, having subject matter experts together	RCC and Police relationship good, but others don't know. Start with 10 min RCC starter, and detailed SITREP	Standardisation of 'where we're at'. Single source of truth
POLICE	Real time running, liked the flow, interoperability	Injects after lunch needed dramatic injects, identify to IMT responsibilities (RCC/Police)	Reps from every agency need to be in the room, use experts in IMT (not just Police staff), NEMA website forms
TCC	Vests being worn to identify who's who	Lack of documentation, lack of dashboards	Response Manager – to help integrate, operational comms plan
ST JOHN	Getting everyone together, good lessons about capability, comms channels open and available	Context of info was a challenge, status reports and a SITREP (where were they?)	If SAR tasked with MassCas, standup IMT reps asap, give duty manager the heads up, google docs templates
ONSCENE COORD	Request to put the teams on standby (wealth of assets), LandSAR/Surf/CG all working together	Running log on the wall, not all info passed on, consider tasking time – IAP would help, more detail on the wall	Photos of liferafts/boats/ship, A comms plan
FENZ	Teams working together	ICP level intel, ex's make tactical decisions questionable	Interagency interoperability, include recent previous ex action points into next ex
MARITIME NZ	-	Common operating picture – logs on wall, IAP, etc	Use shipping agents for info/detail
AIRPORT	-	Exclusion zones – air including UAS	Liaise with the airport
CUSTOMS	Seeing how it unfolded	Crew/pax list, lack of info, customs for hazardous substances on ships	Don't wait to be asked, offer advice
MBIE	-	MFAT for an ambassador	Don't wait to be asked – offer advice
HOSPITAL	-	Wasn't notified until 1005, Consider ED doctor to scene, hospital needs timeframes for patients, helos, etc.	Don't text page, add hospital numbers via St John
IWI/HAPU	Good to liaise at Lo-Con SAR level	Comms to Iwi could have been better/earlier	Use local Hapu
GENERAL	Very good to get so many agencies and experts in the room together working closely and in a team	IAP early – timeline, mission, name, photos Use visual aids on wall to develop sit awareness for all	Training across agencies, not just ex's, Lo-Con in a separate room

Appendix C - Timeline of Exercise Events

Time	Action
0545	ExCon Activates
0609	Exercise commences – call to local SAR Coordinator
0800	Main body arrives and is allocated IMT roles and teams
0840	IC briefing - Exercise briefing (overview), Controllers intent, initial tasks and scenario provided
0900/0930/1030	IMT Team briefings
1107	Response manager established in IMT (with Deputy Controller)
1115	'Reset meeting' - IC meets with ExCon, Police Observer and facilitator
1130	Briefing – outlining IAP
1206	IC briefing to Area Commander
1230/1330	IMT team briefings. Discussing handover – how, what, when
1420	Situation Report (Sit Rep) delivered
1500	Shift handover to incoming IC – full team briefing
1540	End ex called
1545	Hot Debrief conducted
1630	Hot debrief concludes, end of day
0900	Following day (Thursday) - Cold Debrief
1215	Cold debrief concludes. All agencies' personnel depart

Appendix D – Evidence of IMT in Action




Deputy Controller conducting a briefing to functional team leads.



Teams in action – PIM in right foreground.



Safety and Intelligence working areas.



NZ Customs working area.

LIFEBOAT

Winched - 3
 located → hotel

Hel'd to Iga hospital - 2
 located

LIFERAFT
 Motiki Island - 11
 * 10 to hospital
 1 deceased - located
 Details to come

* Maketu Beach - 8
 ??

* Pukehina Beach - 1
 1 deceased

Life Boat - 132
 118 Status 3/4 - located @ hotel
 * 8 Status 1 } details to come
 * 5 Status 2 } → Iga hospital
 * 1 Deceased

ZODIAC
 * Captain + 6 - CO centre
 Details to come

ZODIAC + LIFERAFT
 * Tect rescue - 30??
 - CO centre
 Details to come

Hel'd from water - 4
 3 located @ hospital
 1 Deceased

197 / 256
 Approx

Reconciling passengers to the manifest.

OP SILVER PACIFIC

AIM:
 Strategic Policy (Planning)
 - sea upch / 1200
 - Skill - Weather/ tidal exp.
 - Planning
 - Ops
 - Briefing

PLANNING:
 AIM: To ensure safety of all passengers and crew of the Silver Pacific

INITIAL ACTION PLAN:

- Understand location of vessels
- Adequately resource - to receive those from the ship.
- Ensure individual safety-welfare needs are met.
- Adequate triaging point - to address health/casualty/mortality
- support overnight logistics including transport.

FENZ
 Scott Bell
 Len Sabin

256 POS
 1 x life boat
 3 x life RAFT - NOW POWERLESS
 5 x ZODIAC

IMT Training Reconciliation
 230725/6285
 Op Email Address:
 OpSilverPacific@police.govt.nz

- Staff Partner
 - Safety
 - Welfare

IAP overview and working notes.




IC delivering an update briefing.




Shift changeover – delivering situation report.

Appendix E – Exercise Arrangements



HiCon and LoCon



Concept of Excon relationship to Players